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REFORMING U.S. PATENT LAW TO ENABLE
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES IN THE
ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ELIF KAVUSTURAN, S.J.D.

ABSTRACT—The patent system has long been criticized for limiting access
to pharmaceuticals. Patents grant inventors a limited period of exclusivity
with an attempt to allow recoupment of investments in the invention process.
In the pharmaceutical industry, this exclusivity and the resulting lack of
competition leads to exorbitant prices. High prices limit access to potentially
life-saving medicines and hinder achievement of the “highest attainable
standard of health,” which several international instruments recognize as a
human right.
The pharmaceutical industry claims patents are essential to encourage
innovation in risky, lengthy and costly research and development (R&D)
processes. But it has yet to put forward indisputable evidence to the actual
effects of patents on innovation.
Increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in research intensifies the
existing debates on pharmaceutical patents. Inventions created or enabled by
AI raise questions about patentability and patent policy in general. Faster and
more efficient R&D weakens justifications for pharmaceutical patents.
While continued incentivization is essential, lawmakers must consider
alternative systems, which prioritize access alongside incentivization in
order to advance health care as a human right. One way to increase access
while maintaining the necessary incentives for innovation is to reform
standards of patentability, leaving some essential medicines enabled by AI
outside the sphere of patent protection, and fund R&D through prize funds
and tax incentives in the absence of patents. Alternatively, a shorter
exclusivity term, followed by a licensing period allowing competitors to
make and sell the related medicines against a licensing fee, will enable
competing products to enter the market earlier and drive prices down and
provide innovating companies a method to recoup investments.
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INTRODUCTION
“[A]nd supporting their master were attendants made of gold, which seemed
like living maidens. In their hearts there is intelligence, and they have voice and
vigor, and from the immortal gods they have learned skills.”1

Robotic handmaidens helped Vulcan in his workshop in Homer’s Iliad.
The handmaidens resembled people and had knowledge, sense, and reason.
Twenty-eight centuries later, robot scientists and artificial intelligence (AI)
systems aid researchers in the lab, much like Vulcan’s handmaidens.2
While AI has not reached human level intelligence yet, it is already
reshaping industries.3 One of the fields that stands to benefit the most from
1

HOMER, THE ILIAD 137 (Caroline Alexander trans., HarperCollins 2016).
See, e.g., Ying Chen, Elenee Argentinis & Griff Weber, IBM Watson: How Cognitive Computing
Can Be Applied to Big Data Challenges in Life Sciences Research, 38 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 688, 698
(2016); Kevin Williams et al., Cheaper Faster Drug Development Validated by the Repositioning of
Drugs Against Neglected Tropical Diseases, J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE, Mar. 6, 2015, at 1, 2.
3 See Iain M. Cockburn, Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on
Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24449, 2018); Erica Fraser, Computers as
Inventors—Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED 305, 327
(2016), https://script-ed.org/article/computers-as-inventors-legal-and-policy-implications-of-artificialintelligence-on-patent-law/ [https://perma.cc/PS5X-RTBT]; Business Insider Intelligence, The AI
Disruption Bundle: The Guide to Understanding How Artificial Intelligence is Impacting the World, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/understanding-artificial-intelligenceimpacting-world-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/LVX4-CVM5]; Paul Heltzel, 8 Technologies That Will
Disrupt
Business
in
2020,
CIO
(Aug.
26,
2019,
3:00
AM),
https://www.cio.com/article/3254744/emerging-technology/technologies-that-will-disrupt-business.html
[http://perma.cc/5FTA-A9SX]; Gil Press, 5 Top Technologies for Digital Disruption, FORBES (Apr. 27,
2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/04/27/5-top-technologies-for-digital2
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AI is health care.4 AI has the potential to decrease the time it takes for
pharmaceutical companies to research, develop, and bring new drugs to
market.5 AI will reduce the cost of pharmaceutical research and development
(R&D) and increase the efficiency of the innovation process.6
Patent rights enable patent holders to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale or selling their inventions during the patent term.7
This right of exclusion aims to “promote the progress of science and useful
arts.”8 According to the Supreme Court, the right serves to compensate
inventors for their labor and expenses in bringing inventions to practice and
disclosing them to the public.9 Under the existing “one-size-fits-all” system,
all inventions that satisfy the standards of patentability are eligible for patent
protection, without regard to their social effects, their costs, or the
technologies used in the innovation process.10
Patents allow patent holders to operate without competition, thus
enabling higher prices.11

disruption/2/#32b1eca677fc [https://perma.cc/96R9-27V9]; Anne Vandermey, The 12 Disruptive Tech
Trends You Need to Know, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015, 4:09 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/mckinseydisruptive/ [https://perma.cc/38W8-T42X].
4 See PETER STONE ET AL., ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LIFE
IN
2030:
REPORT
OF
THE
2015
STUDY
PANEL
25
(2016),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RFV-7WPT].
5 See Williams et al., supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that full automation and standardization of processes
could lead to a “radical decrease in the cost and increase in the speed of drug discovery”); David Rotman,
AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/15/137023/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/
[https://perma.cc/9HK6-55JN] (arguing that deep learning has the potential to “speed up the process” of
finding drug candidates).
6 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7 (claiming that learning-based AI technologies can result in
“dramatically lower costs and improved performance in R&D projects”); Bertin Martens, The Importance
of Data Access Regimes for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 5 (Eur. Comm’n Joint Rsch.
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2018-09, 2018) (asserting machine learning “reduces the cost and increases the
efficiency of decision making”).
7 35 U.S.C. § 154.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (indicating that Congress shall have the power “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries”).
9 See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (holding that patent rights are “public franchises
granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such
inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make and use and
vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the
inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit”).
10 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.
11 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1031, 1054–55 (2005).
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High prices are especially problematic in the pharmaceutical industry.
Consumers in the United States pay more for pharmaceuticals than
consumers in any other country.12 A prescription worth $1,362 in the United
Kingdom costs $2,669 in the United States.13 In 2017, 11.4 percent of
patients prescribed drugs chose to forego treatment as a direct result of high
prices, while 24.9 percent asked for a cheaper alternative or opted for
alternative therapies.14
Pharmaceutical companies cite lengthy and costly R&D to justify the
high prices of pharmaceuticals, asserting high returns are necessary to
incentivize innovation.15 However, the actual effects of patents on innovation
are not clear, and studies showing the excessive investment requirements for
pharmaceutical R&D have been widely criticized for inflating costs.16 AI’s
potential to enable faster and cheaper drug development undermines the
industry’s arguments for patent protection.
As AI starts to play a bigger role in R&D, patent law must be reformed
to reflect AI’s effects on pharmaceutical innovation to recalibrate public and
private interests. Lawmakers must address the disruption caused by AI in the
pharmaceutical innovation process and evaluate alternative mechanisms that
prioritize access to pharmaceuticals while providing the necessary incentives
for pharmaceutical companies.
The chief reason why patent law must be reformed for AI-enabled
pharmaceuticals is to advance health care as a human right.17 Lawmakers
must prioritize essential medicines—those that must be available at all times
in adequate amounts at affordable prices—as these are fundamental to
12 Irene Papanicolas, Liana R. Woskie & Ashish K. Jha, Health Care Spending in the United States
and Other High-Income Countries, 319 [J]AMA 1024, 1031 (2018).
13 See Sarah Kliff, The True Story of America s Sky-High Prescription Drug Prices, VOX (May 10,
2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/30/12945756/prescription-drugprices-explained [https://perma.cc/V54J-B3J4]; see generally Robert Langreth, Drug Prices,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/QUD5-9HT6].
14 See ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., DATA BRIEF N O. 333, STRATEGIES
USED BY ADULTS AGED 18–64 TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS, 2017 at 1, 2 (2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db333-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QU8-VJKZ].
15 F. M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, J.
ECON. PERSPS., Summer 1993, at 97, 103; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2009); Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton,
Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, BIOSOCIETIES, Feb. 7, 2011, at 1, 1–2.
16
See discussion infra Part II, Section C.3.
17 A number of international organizations recognize health as a human right. See, e.g., G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration of Human Rights]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 5, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD];
Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679,
14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution].
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achieving health care as a human right, and aim to increase access to these
pharmaceuticals in order to make sure that the human right to health is
enjoyed by all.18
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I defines AI and related
concepts and demonstrates how technology is revolutionizing innovation.
This Part illustrates increasing use of AI in pharmaceutical research and
provides examples of cases where AI has reduced the length and cost of
pharmaceutical R&D.
Part II provides a brief overview of the existing patent system and
patentability issues arising from AI-enabled inventions. This Part also
discusses the leading arguments for and against the existing patent system
and evaluates issues specific to exclusivity rights in the pharmaceutical
industry, as well as the controversy over the effects of the patent system as a
method of incentivization for pharmaceutical R&D. This Part demonstrates
how the patent system’s overemphasis on incentivization is limiting access
to essential medicines and hindering the realization of health care as a human
right, creating a health crisis as exorbitant prices deprive millions of essential
medicines.
Part III presents alternative models to incentivize pharmaceutical
innovation while increasing access to essential medicines. This Part critically
assesses reforming standards of patentability, leaving some essential
medicines developed utilizing AI outside the scope of patentability, and
using prize funds and tax incentives to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation
in the absence of patents. This Part also evaluates an alternative model that
provides essential medicines enabled by AI with a shorter patent term,
followed by a licensing scheme where the patent holder will allow
competitors to make and distribute the products for a reasonable licensing
fee in line with the related R&D costs.
I.

AI REVOLUTIONIZING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
A. Defining In elligence: Na

al and A ificial

From the beginning of the twentieth century, the most popular method
of quantifying human intelligence had been by the “intelligence quotient” or
“IQ,” which represents a ratio of an individual’s mental age to their actual
age.19 In the 1980s, an American psychologist offered a different approach
18 Essential
Medicines,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
[WHO],
https://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en/ [https://perma.cc/6C9P-PPNT] [hereinafter WHO
Essential Medicines].
19 HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: NEW HORIZONS 3 (2006); see also ANNA T.
CIANCIOLO & ROBERT J. STERNBERG, INTELLIGENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY 30–55 (2004).
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to intelligence. This so-called pluralistic view of the mind based human
intelligence on various abilities and mental skills of the individual.20
According to this approach, intelligence is “a computational capacity”
entailing the ability to “solve problems or fashion products that are of
consequence in a particular cultural setting or community.” 21 Removing the
human aspect from this definition, a good way to define intelligence would
then be the “quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with
foresight in its environment.”22
Experts in the field have not reached a consensus on a single definition
for AI.23 John McCarthy, who was the first to use the term, defines it as “the
science and engineering of making intelligent machines.”24 Others have
defined it as the task of designing rational agents that maximize their
expected utility given what they learn from their environment.25 For the
purposes of this Article, AI can simply be defined as the science of creating
machines and systems that are capable of understanding their environment
and functioning accordingly.26

20

GARDNER, supra note 19, at 6.
Id.
22 NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 13 (2010).
23 See AI NOW, THE AI NOW REPORT: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
TECHNOLOGIES
IN
THE
NEAR-TERM
2
n.1
(2016),
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2016_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VW-VZXS].
24 John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?, Articles, PROFESSOR JOHN MCCARTHY 2 (Nov.
12, 2007, 2:05 AM), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/whatisai/whatisai.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KEK7H5G].
25 See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH
1044 (3d ed. 2010).
26 The United States has not yet adopted an official legal definition of AI. A 2017 bill defines AI
systems broadly:
(A) Any artificial systems that perform tasks under varying and unpredictable
circumstances, without significant human oversight, or that can learn from their
experience and improve their performance. Such systems may be developed in
computer software, physical hardware, or other contexts not yet contemplated. They
may solve tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning,
communication, or physical action. In general, the more human-like the system
within the context of its tasks, the more it can be said to use artificial intelligence.
(B) Systems that think like humans, such as cognitive architectures and neural
networks.
(C) Systems that act like humans, such as systems that can pass the Turing test or
other comparable test via natural language processing, knowledge representation,
automated reasoning, and learning.
(D) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that seek to approximate some
cognitive task.
21
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B. Machine Lea ning and Dee Lea ning
Depending on the purpose and capacity of an AI system, it may be
categorized as weak or strong. Weak AI, also called narrow AI, is
programmed to carry out a single task, and is not capable of solving problems
outside of its field.27 A driverless car, for instance, is capable of driving
autonomously.28 Yet, it cannot perform any other task. Strong AI, on the
other hand, has the ability to think and reason autonomously.29 General AI is
comparable to a human being in terms of “cognitive, emotional and social
behavior[].”30
The ultimate aim of the field of AI is to create general AI, capable of
“solv[ing] problems and achiev[ing] goals in the world as well as humans.”31
However, matching human abilities is not a necessary condition for a system
to be considered intelligent.32 While incapable of performing diverse tasks,
many existing systems exceed human performance in certain aspects, most
notably in speed.33
Until recently, so-called expert systems required scientists to supply
inputs in the form of data and interpret the outputs offered by the system.34
To program these systems, programmers had to collaborate with experts
from each field to learn the rules and decision-making criteria relating to the

(E) Systems that act rationally, such as intelligent software agents and embodied
robots that achieve goals via perception, planning, reasoning, learning,
communicating, decision making, and acting.
FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. § (3)(a)(1) (2017).
27 See
UK-RAS NETWORK, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS 6 (2017),
https://www.ukras.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/UK_RAS_wp_AI_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U26M-K8HJ].
28 See, e.g., James Armstrong, How Do Driverless Cars Work?, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2018, 5:10
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/cars/features/how-do-driverless-cars-work/ [https://perma.cc/RB2AQUU6]; Alex Davies, The WIRED Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/SDK8-JT8Z].
29 See UK-RAS NETWORK, supra note 27.
30 H.R. 4625.
31 McCarthy, supra note 24, at 5.
32 See ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., supra note 4, at 13.
33 Id.
34 RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 25, at 1044.
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problem at hand.35 They would then translate these rules into code.36 Machine
learning changed this burdensome approach.37
Machine learning is a statistical process where the system
autonomously derives rules and procedures from a set of data and comes up
with explanations or predictions.38 The biggest advantage of machine
learning is that it does not focus on solving a single problem but offers
solutions to different problems based on available data.39 Machine learning
operates by finding patterns in data and using these patterns to formulate and
test hypotheses about the task at hand.40 Today, many commercial
applications of AI use machine learning.41 Object identification in images,
speech-to-text services, recommendation services, and search result
customization are a few examples of machine learning in action.42 A
significant benefit of machine learning is that it reduces costs and increases
efficiency in decision-making processes.43 As such, machine learning is also
a valuable tool to aid researchers in pharmaceutical innovation.44
Deep learning is a sub-field of machine learning, which uses structures
similar to the human brain.45 Deep learning networks are capable of
recognizing complex and precise patterns in large datasets, by using layers
and units referred to as “neurons,” in a manner that is similar to the
operations of the human brain.46 With increased ability to interpret data, deep

35

SUBCOMM. ON MACH. LEARNING AND A.I., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE
FUTURE
OF
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
8
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/prepar
ing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ2L-DMHX].
36 Id.
37 See Kurt Benke & Geza Benke, Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Public Health, INT’L J.
ENVTL. RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 10, 2018, at 1, 4–5, https://www.mdpi.com/16604601/15/12/2796/htm [https://perma.cc/9FYX-BTEE].
38 See id. For a study of machine learning as a tool for mining chemical information for drug design,
see Yu-Chen Lo et al., Machine Learning in Chemoinformatics and Drug Discovery, 23 DRUG
DISCOVERY TODAY 1538, 1540–41 (2018).
39 See Benke & Benke, supra note 37, at 4–5.
40 Trishan Panch, Peter Szolovits & Rifat Atun, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Health
Systems, J. GLOB. HEALTH, Dec. 2018, at 1, 3.
41 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON TECH., supra note 35, at 8.
42 See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436
(2015); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew Mcafee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 21, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/VWJ4-K8EH].
43 Martens, supra note 6, at 7.
44 Lo et al., supra note 38, at 1538.
45 SUBCOMM. ON MACH. LEARNING AND A.I., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 9.
46 Id. at 9–10.
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learning outperforms machine learning techniques in image and speech
recognition, as well as predicting the activities of potential drug molecules.47
C. AI in Pha mace ical R&D
Medicine and health care stand to benefit substantially from AI. 48 AI is
used in the health care industry for such purposes as enhancing the
capabilities, know-how, and expertise of doctors and medical professionals,
helping monitor patients’ conditions in a constant and comprehensive
manner, increasing quality of life for people with certain diseases or
disabilities, predicting diseases, and customizing treatments.49 AI systems

47

LeCun et al., supra note 42, at 436.
See ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., supra note 4, at 25; CTR. FOR DEVICES AND
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH INNOVATION ACTION PLAN 1–
2 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download [https://perma.cc/W2RF-9G8P]; AM. MED.
ASS’N, AUGMENTED INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE 2–3 (2018), https://www.amaassn.org/system/files/2019-01/augmented-intelligence-policy-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37UK5HAL]; Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future, 2 STROKE &
VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 230–31 (2017); Mike Miliard, FDA Chief Sees Big Things for AI in
Healthcare,
HEALTHCARE
IT
NEWS
(Apr.
30,
2018,
08:51
AM),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/fda-chief-sees-big-things-ai-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/2VW6-87SK].
49
See, e.g, News Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial
Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm604357.htm
[https://perma.cc/GF94-QBL3] (indicating that an AI device can detect eye disease without interpretation
from a doctor or clinician); News Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes Marketing of
First Cardiac Ultrasound Software That Uses Artificial Intelligence to Guide User (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-marketing-first-cardiacultrasound-software-uses-artificial-intelligence-guide-user [https://perma.cc/LTR8-RKS9] (indicating
that the AI tool allows “medical professionals who may not be experts in ultrasonography” to diagnose
heart diseases); About da Vinci Systems, INTUITIVE, https://www.davincisurgery.com/da-vincisystems/about-da-vinci-systems [https://perma.cc/6BPS-TFVG] (discussing the da Vinci Surgical
System that allows surgeons to operate on patients through small incisions via a magnified vision system,
enhancing surgeon’s capabilities by reducing the effects of shaking hands and enabling finer movements
than naturally possible); News Release, Johns Hopkins Med., The Johns Hopkins Hospital Launches
Capacity Command
Center
to Enhance Hospital
Operations
(Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/the_johns_hopkins_hospital_launches_capacity
_command_center_to_enhance_hospital_operations [https://perma.cc/KN5D-WBZV] (discussing Johns
Hopkins Medicine’s AI-powered command center, which led to thirty percent faster bed assignments,
and a sixty percent increase in patient transfers from other hospitals, while decreasing by seventy percent
the delays in transfer of patients from operating rooms following procedures); News Release, Taunton
and Somerset NHS Found. Tr., New Mobile App for the Digital Age (June 21, 2017) (on file with author)
(discussing Google Deep Mind Health’s deployment to observe critical patients, and alert doctors and
nurses where the data indicates an urgent need for care).
48
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are also used in various stages of the drug development process, ranging
from initial drug screening to designing clinical trials.50
The pharmaceutical industry is the most research-intensive industry in
the United States.51 Researchers alone, however, are limited in their capacity
to innovate in an efficient and rapid manner.52 AI improves performance and
decreases costs of R&D.53 Pharmaceutical companies use AI to enhance
R&D capabilities, increase efficiency, and decrease the time and investment
required by the drug development process.54
Machine learning is most commonly used in drug discovery55 to aid
researchers in understanding relationships between chemicals and their
activities.56 Deep learning algorithms are capable of processing vast amounts
of data to make accurate predictions about the effects of molecules.57 These
predictions help researchers focus on a smaller number of drug candidates

50

See, e.g., H.C. Stephen Chan et al., Advancing Drug Discovery via Artificial Intelligence, 40
TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 592, 592–604 (2019); Stefan Harrer et al., Artificial Intelligence for
Clinical Trial Design, 40 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 577, 577–91 (2019).
51 F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927,
927 (2004).
52 See Rotman, supra note 5 (discussing the reasons for declining productivity in research in the
recent years, and how technology companies are trying to use AI to increase R&D productivity to
overcome problems with research, including efforts to shorten research time).
53 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7.
54 See Nic Fleming, Computer-Calculated Compounds, 557 NATURE S55, S55 (2018) (indicating that
the likes of Pfizer and Sanofi invest in AI and that if advocates are right in their claims, AI will help
achieve the goal of “quicker, cheaper and more-effective drug discovery”); Ben Hirschler, Big Pharma
Turns to AI to Speed Drug Discovery, GSK Signs Deal, REUTERS (July 1, 2017, 8:10 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-ai-gsk/big-pharma-turns-to-ai-to-speed-drugdiscovery-gsk-signs-deal-idUSKBN19N003 [https://perma.cc/3UFC-7YDU] (reporting that a
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) executive expects an in-house system will decrease the time it takes to find a
target for disease intervention and identify a molecule fighting it from its current average of 5.5 years to
one year, and chief executive of Exscientia claims that their AI system can deliver drug candidates in
roughly twenty-five percent of the time and cost of traditional approaches); Bryn Nelson, Why Big
Pharma and Biotech are Betting Big on AI, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2018, 11:58 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/why-big-pharma-betting-big-ai-ncna852246
[https://perma.cc/MH24-LY73] (reporting that AI groups are aiming to cut down the initial stage of
pharmaceutical research, which consists of identifying a disease target and testing drug candidates against
that target, from its current time of four to six years to one year); Rotman, supra note 5 (claiming that
deep learning has the potential to speed up the process of finding drug candidates, which is a critical and
lengthy portion of the drug development process).
55 Drug discovery is the first stage of drug development where researchers identify target diseases
and test drug candidates against such targets. See Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a
Medicine from Lab to Shelf, PHARMACEUTICAL J. (May 12, 2015), https://www.pharmaceuticaljournal.com/publications/tomorrows-pharmacist/drug-development-the-journey-of-a-medicine-fromlab-to-shelf/20068196.article?firstPass=false [https://perma.cc/825B-N5YL].
56 Lo et al., supra note 38, at 1538.
57 Chan et al., supra note 50, at 601.
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that are more likely to pass clinical trials.58 AI systems can also bring the
traditional number of screened compounds from one million to several
billion, while decreasing the time it takes to screen such compounds from
several months to a few days.59
Big data represents endless opportunities in medicine.60 However, the
sheer volume of data and the velocity with which data becomes available
represents serious challenges.61 In 2016, researchers had access to “nearly
200,000 active clinical trials, 21,000 drug components, 1,357 unique drugs,
22,000 genes, and hundreds of thousands of proteins,” as well as more than
twenty-four million medical and scientific articles.62 According to a 2012
study conducted in five universities in the United States, however, faculty
members read around twenty-one scholarly articles per month, or an average
of 252 articles annually.63
In addition to the vast amount of data researchers must be familiar with
to keep up-to-date with progress in their field, drug development further
requires analysis of existing literature, preclinical study reports, clinical trial
data, and patents.64 No individual researcher is capable of sifting through big
data in the amount of time that an intelligent system can. Furthermore,
humans are limited in their knowledge; even an expert in a given field will
have limited-to-no know-how in another field of expertise.65
AI enables researchers to cope with big data and synthesize data from
different fields. IBM’s AI system, Watson, reads, reasons, learns and makes
inferences from available data, and offers solutions based on its learnings.66
Watson starts the learning process by accessing the “Watson corpus”
database to review available data corresponding to the related field.67
Separate datasets consisting of external, public, private, and licensed sources

58

See id. at 592–99.
Id. at 601.
60 See, e.g., Chen et al., supra note 2, at 689.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 CAROL TENOPIR, RACHEL VOLENTINE & LISA CHRISTIAN, CTR. FOR INFO. AND COMM. STUD.,
SCHOLARLY READING BY FACULTY IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY RESULTS OF A STUDY
CONDUCTED
IN
2012
IN
FIVE
UNIVERSITIES
3–4
(2013),
http://www.libvalue.org/documents/libvalue/publications/tenopir-volentine-christian-us-faculty2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF9R-YAKC].
64
Chen et al., supra note 2, at 696.
65 See Hiroaki Kitano, Artificial Intelligence to Win the Nobel Prize and Beyond: Creating the Engine
for Scientific Discovery, AI MAG., Spring 2016, at 39, 41–43 (discussing cognitive limitations as they
relate to the biomedical sciences, such as the inability of humans to keep up with the vast amount of
available data).
66 Chen et al., supra note 2, at 691–94.
67 Id. at 691.
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exist for each field that Watson is used in, including law, finance, and
medicine.68 Watson also has access to ontologies on genes, proteins, drugs,
and diseases,69 as well as dictionaries and thesauri to ensure it fully
understands what it reads.70
In one demonstration, it took Watson less than a single minute to
process twenty-four million article abstracts and provide researchers with
177 documents mentioning genes connected with multiple sclerosis.71 It then
created a network map, from which researchers could access summaries of
relationships between the disease and different genes, and a link to the
relevant section of the related article.72
IBM and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) recently carried out a pilot project to
demonstrate the ability of Watson to detect insights and relationships from
separate domains of data.73 The aim of the project was to identify any
compounds in GlaxoSmithKline’s existing drug portfolio that could
potentially be used to treat malaria.74 Malaria is a disease mostly found in
developing countries where investment in R&D for malaria drugs is
limited.75 However, it has been the subject of extensive research, with 60,000
articles in the Medline database referring to the disease.76
In the pilot project, Watson was deployed to review this literature,
searching for drugs approved for use in humans and statements about
efficacy against malaria.77 Following its literature review, Watson analyzed
GSK’s existing drug portfolio to search for drugs with similar chemical
structures to drugs that are known for treating malaria.78 Within one month,
Watson came up with fifteen candidates.79 The company had been carrying
out the same research with a team of ten researchers for the last fourteen
months.80 The research team had come up with a similar number of
candidates, although half of the candidates Watson identified were not on
their list.81 The project was a clear indication of Watson’s potential to
68

Id.
Id. at 696.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 694.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 697–98.
74 Id. at 698.
75 SCOTT SPANGLER, ACCELERATING DISCOVERY: MINING UNSTRUCTURED INFORMATION FOR
HYPOTHESIS GENERATION 151 (2015).
76 Id.
77 Chen et al., supra note 2, at 698.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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outperform human researchers in terms of time spent in the drug discovery
process.82 It also demonstrated Watson’s ability to diversify approaches to
resolving presented problems.83
Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of similar cases of
AI deployment in pharmaceutical innovation. One AI system, which
analyzes data from clinical trials and academic articles to find new drug
candidates and potential uses for existing drug candidates,84 took a single
week to come up with five drug candidates for the disease ALS.85 Another
AI system analyzed oncological data and discovered a treatment for
pancreatic cancer, which is currently in Phase II of clinical trials.86
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University used the predictive capabilities
of a machine learning system to decrease the number of tests run on new
drugs by seventy percent.87
Most recently, a machine learning algorithm that can screen over “a
hundred million chemical compounds in a matter of days” helped researchers
identify a new antibiotic compound that “killed many of the world’s most
problematic disease-causing bacteria, including some strains that are
resistant to all known antibiotics.”88 Another AI system helped invent a new
compound aimed at treating obsessive-compulsive disorder, which will be
the first compound created by AI to be tried on humans.89 The system

82

GSK and IBM have yet to publish the outcome of further tests on the candidates offered by Watson
in the pilot project.
83 See Steve Lohr, And Now, From I.B.M., Chef Watson, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/technology/ibm-exploring-new-feats-for-watson.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/4CH2-NTG8].
84 João Medeiros, This AI Unicorn is Disrupting the Pharma Industry in a Big Way, WIRED: WIRED
HEALTH (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/benevolent-ai-london-unicorn-pharma-startup
[https://perma.cc/6ZM5-64BJ]; see also Using Artificial Intelligence to Optimise Small-Molecule Drug
Design, BENEVOLENTAI (Mar. 28, 2019), https://benevolent.ai/blog/using-artificial-intelligence-tooptimise-small-molecule-drug-design [https://perma.cc/UF6A-FBTH].
85 Nelson, supra note 54.
86 Press Release, BERG, BERG Announces FDA Orphan-Drug Designation of BPM31510 for the
Treatment of Pancreatic Cancer (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.berghealth.com/berg-announces-fdaorphan-drug-designation-of-bpm31510-for-the-treatment-of-pancreatic-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/FEC6W44F].
87 Chris Wood, Machine-Learning Robot Could Streamline Drug Development, NEW ATLAS (Feb.
10, 2016), http://newatlas.com/machine-learning-drug-development/41759/ [https://perma.cc/6ELEEQFJ]; see Carnegie Mellon Univ., Drug Discovery System, NAT’L ROBOTICS ENG’G CTR.,
https://www.nrec.ri.cmu.edu/nrec/solutions/otherindustries/drug-discovery-system.html
[https://perma.cc/R72H-LMWQ].
88 Anne Trafton, Artificial Intelligence Yields New Antibiotic, MIT NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020),
http://news.mit.edu/2020/artificial-intelligence-identifies-new-antibiotic-0220 [https://perma.cc/635KE6Q3].
89 Jane Wakefield, Artificial Intelligence-Created Medicine to be Used on Humans for First Time,
BBC (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51315462 [https://perma.cc/GFP6-MJJP].
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“generate[d] tens of millions of potential molecules, sift[ed] through the
candidates and [made] a decision about which ones to synthesize and test,”
allowing researchers to test only 350 compounds, one fifth of the normal
number of candidates that would need to be tested under the traditional R&D
process.90 The compound is now entering human clinical trials after only
twelve months, as opposed to the average 4.5 years.91
These are some of the cases that demonstrate AI’s potential to
“dramatically lower costs and improve[] performance” in R&D, including
pharmaceutical innovation.92 Patents, and associated exclusivity rights,
represent a trade-off between innovation and lower prices resulting from
competition.93 Social costs of the patent system are the most significant in
the pharmaceutical industry, as lack of access to pharmaceuticals denies a
considerable portion of the world’s population from their most basic of
human rights—the right to health.94 AI’s disruption of pharmaceutical
innovation further weakens justifications for pharmaceutical patents,
especially for patents on essential medicines.
II. PATENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AI SYSTEMS AND PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION
A. A B ief P ime on Pa en La
A patent grant entitles inventors to a right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling their inventions (or in cases of
patented processes, any resulting products) throughout the United States, as
well as importing these inventions into the United States, during the term of
the related patent.95 The basic principle behind patent law is that patent

90 Madhumita Murgia, AI-Designed Drug to Enter Human Clinical Trial for First Time, FIN. TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/fe55190e-42bf-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c
[https://perma.cc/GB4H-354D].
91 Id.
92 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7.
93 See COPENHAGEN ECON., STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROTECTION
CERTIFICATES,
PHARMACEUTICAL
INCENTIVES AND REWARDS IN
EUROPE (2018),
https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/dyn/resources/Publication/publicationPDF/5/445/1527517171/
copenhagen-economics-2018-study-on-the-economic-impact-of-spcs-pharmaceutical-incentives-andrewards-in-europe.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4UKH-DCX7].
94 See Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. D OC. A/63/263,
at 15 (Aug. 11, 2008) (indicating that almost 2 billion people around the world lack access to essential
medicines).
95 See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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holders are granted a limited period of exclusion, during which they can
restrain competition from using the patented invention.96
According to the Supreme Court, this right of exclusion is
compensation for inventors’ “labor, toil, and expense in making the
inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit.”97 The
right to exclude is a quid pro quo for the benefit the public derives from the
disclosure and availability of inventions.98 Courts have further ruled that the
ultimate goal of the patent system is the public use and disclosure of
inventions.99
Patent law is a “one-size-fits-all system,” which does not distinguish
inventions and associated rights based on technology.100 Patent law also does
not address the problem of balancing incentivization against the need for
equitable access. In providing incentives for innovation, the existing system
does not differentiate between luxury goods and life-saving drugs,
effectively prioritizing private over public interest.
B. E al a ing he Co

and Benefi of he Pa en S

em

The most widely cited justification for patent law is that it provides a
method for inventors to reap the benefits of their inventions and recoup R&D
investments, which in turn encourages innovation and progress.101 The
pharmaceutical industry often claims patents are essential for innovation, as
they provide a method for compensating costly R&D associated with drug
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Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 568, 568 (2007).
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870).
98 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
99 See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810
F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
100 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1155, 1155 (2002); see John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent
System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2015); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 364 (2007); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for
Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 678 (2014).
101 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003); Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws
Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978-2002, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 436, 436 (2007); E. Richard Gold
et al., Are Patents Impeding Medical Care and Innovation?, 7 PLOS MED. 1 (2010),
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000208&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/GP4S-PS3R]; Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent
System Stack up in Pharmaceuticals, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 81 (2004); Jonathan M. Barnett, Private
Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2004).
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development.102 However, evidence on how the patent system actually
affects innovation is inconclusive.103
Economically, patents offer a bargain between the inventor and the
general public.104 The right of exclusion granted to patent holders is aimed at
encouraging innovation by preventing imitation by third parties during the
patent term.105 In return, patent holders are required to disclose their
inventions to the public.106 This is the “classic patent trade-off,”107 a quid pro
quo for the benefit the public derives from the disclosure and availability of
inventions.108
Patent law aims to advance social welfare by mandating disclosure of
inventions to the public, enabling third parties to access the know-how
necessary to make and use the inventions.109 Public disclosure of inventions

102 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 1, 4, 9 (2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balancecompetition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX57-E5HR] [hereinafter
FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW]; Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 94–99 (2004); Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 346, 350;
Christopher Rowland, Drug Executives Grilled in Senate Over High Prices, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/drug-executives-grilled-in-senate-over-highprices/2019/02/25/abc89c04-393f-11e9-aaae69364b2ed137_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.65388d498909 [https://perma.cc/99KZ-ZP45];
Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 34–35; Roin, supra note 15, at 510–11; Scherer, supra note 15, at
103.
103 Some empirical research supports the view that greater patent protection is correlated with higher
R&D expenditure. See, e.g., Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur
Technological Change?, 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 235, 235–64 (2003); Yongmin Chen & Thitima
Puttitanun, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries, 78 J. DEV. ECON. 474,
474–93 (2005). However, there is also conflicting research indicating that patent protection does not have
a significant impact on R&D investments. See, e.g., Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger
Patents Induce More Innovation?, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77–100 (1992).
104 Hall, supra note 96, at 571; see also Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and
Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 57, 57 (2005); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003).
105 Hall, supra note 96, at 568.
106 Id.
107 Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Patent Protection: Policy Implications from the Literature 6
(Oct. 30, 2003) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=467489 [https://perma.cc/RPB82N9L].
108 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); see also Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and
Patent Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 489, 495 (Woodrow
Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018).
109 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring the specification accompanying the patent application to describe
the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use” the invention); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 35 (4th ed. 2017); World Intell.
Prop. Org. [WIPO], Report on the International Patent System, at 10, SCP/12/3 Rev.2 (Feb. 3, 2009),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3_rev_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X2T-KMNP]
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also aims to reduce duplicative R&D efforts and serves as guidance for
competitors on deciding where to target their R&D investments.110
Whether these benefits of the patent system justify its social and
economic costs has been an issue of much debate.111 One significant cost
associated with the patent system is that patents can lead to higher prices.112
The right to exclude competitors from introducing alternative products to the
market allows patent holders to charge exorbitant prices.113 In the case of
pharmaceuticals, prices mostly exceed what is necessary to recoup R&D
investments.114
For instance, a 2019 study of ninety-nine cancer drugs approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) showed that high prices allowed
pharmaceutical companies to recoup “maximum possible risk-adjusted
cost[s]” of R&D within an average of five years, and that these drugs
continued to generate significant revenue thereafter, even following
expiration of any exclusivity terms.115 Exorbitant prices restrict access for
some potential customers, leading to a misallocation of social resources, or

[hereinafter WIPO Report on the International Patent System]; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note
101, at 328.
110 See WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 10 (indicating that the
patent system allows dissemination of knowledge and access by the public to such knowledge through
disclosure requirements, which in turn decreases duplicative R&D efforts); FTC REPORT ON
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4 (indicating that representatives of the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries use disclosures to direct their R&D efforts, while generic
manufacturers use disclosures to “design-around” patented pharmaceuticals to avoid infringement).
111 See, e.g., WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 78–81 (indicating
that the patent system has been a subject of skepticism and providing an analysis of the issues concerning
health); Gifford, supra note 101, at 78 (indicating that pharmaceutical patents are “on the forefront of
controversies” about their effects on “pricing and exclusion”).
112 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13 (4th ed. 2006); Gifford, supra note 101, at 83; Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 312 (2013).
113 MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 13; see Gifford, supra note 101, at 83; see also Hemel &
Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 312.
114 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 101, at 296.
115 Kiu Tay-Teo et al., Comparison of Sales Income and Research and Development Costs for FDAApproved Cancer Drugs Sold by Originator Drug Companies, [J]AMA NETWORK 1 (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2720075
[https://perma.cc/EYH66V5Q].
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a so-called “deadweight loss.”116 Deadweight loss is particularly concerning
in the case of pharmaceuticals, as lack of access poses health risks.117
Another significant cost of the patent system is that it indirectly
encourages innovation in larger markets, leading to a misallocation of R&D
efforts.118 The current system encourages patent holders to maximize the
revenue generated from their patents and does not duly incentivize
innovation in areas where there is less market demand.119 In the
pharmaceutical industry, this results in redirection of R&D funds away from
products that may better serve the needs of society.120
Wasteful rent-seeking is another important cost of the patent system.121
Innovating companies compete with each other, invest heavily, and
sometimes waste resources in a “patent race” to become the first to file a
patent.122 Rent-seeking within the patent system may result from a race to
obtain patents, both during patenting and preceding R&D processes, which
may cause competing parties to over-invest.123 In the case of
pharmaceuticals, excessive investments arising from patent races translate to
higher costs for consumers.124

116 Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
999, 1023–24 (2014); see Gifford, supra note 101, at 83, 102 n.118 (2004); Barnett, supra note 101, at
1269; see also Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
247 (1994); see also Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory,
29 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 401, 410 (2016).
117 Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 153, 161 (2016); Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic
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see Gifford, supra note 101, at 1023.
118 See Outterson, supra note 117, at 218.
119 Gifford, supra note 101, at 82.
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and Innovation in India s Shifting IP Regime, Remarks, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 341, 341 (2014); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1713 (2008).
121 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 101, at 17; Barnett, supra note 101, at 1269.
122 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 101, at 17–18; Stiglitz, supra note 120, at 1706–07; Michele
Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PNAS 1252, 1255
(2005).
123 Dam, supra note 116, at 251.
124 Outterson, supra note 117, at 218.
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Lastly, patents limit access to knowledge and inventions.125 The patent
system hinders subsequent innovation by restricting access to knowledge,
data, materials, and processes necessary for research.126 As the number of
patents innovators need to take into account increases, probability of followup innovation decreases, indicating that the system set up to incentivize
innovation discourages it by imposing additional costs and hurdles to
R&D.127
C. Pa en and E cl i i in he Pha mace ical Ind
1. The Human Right to Health Care
Several international organizations and instruments recognize health as
a human right.128 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
every individual has the right to health, which includes the right to medical
care.129 The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Constitution similarly
acknowledges enjoyment of “the highest attainable standard of health” as a
fundamental human right.130
The United Nations recognizes the right of all individuals to the
“enjoyment of highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”131
and defines health as a “fundamental human right indispensable for the
exercise of other human rights.”132 According to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “Covenant”), states must take
steps to realize this right, including steps to ensure treatment of diseases.133
While the Covenant is directly applicable only to states, and not private
parties, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
125 Id. at 201–02; Stiglitz, supra note 120, at 1710; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023; NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 136
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006).
126 Gold et al., supra note 101, at 1.
127 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 122, at 1255 (asserting that “the probability of innovation under
monopoly is smaller than that under competition and drops towards zero” as the number of rights that
innovators need to take into account increases and that the “additional incentive for innovation under an
intellectual property regime is more than completely offset by the additional cost” in such cases); Barnett,
supra note 101, at 1269 (referring to “restricted access to the patented good by subsequent improvers” as
one of the costs of the patent system).
128 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 5; ICERD, supra note 17,
art. 5; WHO Constitution, supra note 17, pmbl.
129 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 25.
130
WHO Constitution, supra note 17, at 1.
131 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
132 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
133 See id. ¶ 16.
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Rights (the “Committee”) declared that all members of society, including
private businesses, have responsibilities in achieving the level of health
foreseen by the Covenant.134 The Committee proposed that states facilitate
the realization of these responsibilities by such means as enacting framework
laws.135
The patent system directly affects realization of health care as a human
right. It enables higher prices, which effectively restrict access to essential
medicines.136 It also encourages investment in larger markets and fails to
provide sufficient incentives for socially valuable pharmaceutical
inventions.137 A successful system should incentivize innovation while
advancing health as a human right.138 The current patent system must thus be
reformed to recalibrate the balance between access and incentivization, and
public and private interest.
2.

Comparing Pharmaceutical Prices in the United States and Other
Countries
Facing criticism over exorbitant prices and monopolistic pricing
practices, pharmaceutical companies claim that high average returns are
necessary to incentivize pharmaceutical R&D, given its high-risk nature.139

134

Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶¶ 42, 56.
136 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101
MINN. L. REV. 167, 168 (2016).
137 See Hunt, supra note 94, ¶¶ 19, 22–23 (reporting that Ministers, senior public officials and others
claim pharmaceutical companies’ practices, including exorbitant prices and lack of investment in R&D
for drugs aimed at developing countries, hinder States’ implementation of the right to the highest
attainable standard of health and, in particular, their endeavors to enhance access to medicines); Sachs,
supra note 117, at 160–71 (claiming that the patent system and FDA regulations “fail to encourage the
production of important, socially valuable pharmaceutical interventions,” and discussing the ways these
systems lead to certain “innovation distortions”).
138 See DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 130; Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access
to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 435 (2003).
139 See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Kuhlik, supra
note 102, at 94–99; Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 346, 350; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Light &
Warburton, supra note 15, at 34–35; Rowland, supra note 102.
135
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Yet, with pharmaceutical companies ranking among the most profitable,140
pharmaceutical prices have sparked controversy throughout the years.141
According to a study based on data from 2013 to 2016, the United States
has a higher per capita spending on health care than any other country.142 The
study found that pharmaceutical spending per capita in the United States was
$1,443, where the mean for all countries under investigation was $749.143
Prices in the United States for four common drugs ranked higher than all of
the other countries analyzed in the study, with the prices of three of these
drugs more than doubling the next highest price on the list.144
A 2018 study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
had similar results.145 The study compared the prices for twenty-seven
physician administered non-retail drugs covered by the Medicare Part B
program with prices in sixteen other countries.146 The researchers found that
Medicare paid almost twice as much as it would have paid for the same or
equivalent drugs as it would in any other country included in the study.147
3. Understanding Cost of Pharmaceutical R&D in the United States
A frequently cited 2003 study estimated the average out-of-pocket cost
(i.e., the actual cash spending) of R&D for each FDA-approved new drug at
$403 million, and the capitalized cost at $802 million (in 2000 dollars).148
140 CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 4 (2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/10-02drugr-d.pdf [https://perma.cc/94KT-LBAH]; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 226 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); Outterson, supra note 117, at 221;
Scherer, supra note 51, at 929; Livan Chen, The Most Profitable Industries in 2016, FORBES (Dec. 21,
2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/12/21/the-most-profitable-industries-in2016/#5f9a5c3e5716 [https://perma.cc/W3RE-9JZR]; Sam Kaplan, Why Our Drugs Cost So Much,
AARP: BULL. (May 1, 2017), https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2017/rx-prescriptiondrug-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/X6V3-C63G].
141 Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927; Gifford, supra note 101, at 78;
Joseph, supra note 138, at 427–28.
142 The study compared the United States to ten high income countries (United Kingdom (including
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Canada, Germany, Australia, Japan, Sweden, France,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) and analyzed data in such domains as general spending,
structural capacity, labor costs, and pharmaceutical spending. Papanicolas et al., supra note 12.
143 Id.
144 The study compared the prices of the pharmaceuticals Crestor, Lantus, Advair, and Humira. Id.
at 1031.
145 OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES FOR TOP MEDICARE PART B DRUGS BY
TOTAL EXPENDITURES (2018).
146 Id. at 5–6.
147 Id. at 8–12.
148 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) [hereinafter DiMasi 2003].
The most recent study by the same scholars indicates that the total out-of-pocket R&D cost for each new
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While the industry asserts the numbers represent a good measure of its R&D
costs, the study has been widely criticized.149
One significant issue with the study is that it does not rely on public and
market-wide data but relies on undisclosed data from only ten
pharmaceutical companies.150 Critics also question the participating
companies’ calculation of R&D costs.151 Some commentators criticize the
lack of clarification as to what expenditures are included within the scope of
R&D costs,152 while others argue that the final number is inflated due to the
inclusion of marketing expenditures, which is not traditionally accepted as
an item under R&D costs.153
Another important factor is that the study does not differentiate between
successful and failed drugs154 and divides the total amount of R&D costs only
by the number of drugs that successfully obtain marketing approval from the
FDA.155 The study was criticized for its limited focus on new molecular
entities (i.e., drugs that contain an active substance not previously approved
for marketing), as opposed to improvement drugs, which are less costly to
develop.156
A critique of the study underlines that both R&D time and investments
vary substantially from one drug to another, and the cost of research is
compound approved by the FDA is $1,395 million, while the capitalized R&D cost per approved new
compound is $2,558 million, in 2013 dollars. These numbers increase to $1,861 million and $2,870
million, respectively, once the R&D costs incurred after the FDA approval are added. See Joseph A.
DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26–27 (2016) [hereinafter DiMasi 2016]. Compared to
the 2003 study, estimated out-of-pocket expenses increased by 166 percent, while estimated capitalized
costs increased by 145 percent. Id. at 31. The scholars reasoned that the increase resulted from higher real
out-of-pocket costs, as well as higher failure rates in human-subject testing. Id.
149 The comments cited here relate to both the 2003 and the follow-up 2016 studies.
150 DiMasi 2003, supra note 148, at 156; DiMasi 2016, supra note 148, at 22.
151 In addition to the issues raised here, one commentator argued that R&D costs are high because
pharmaceutical companies pay excessive marketing fees to researchers and doctors for their support in
clinical trials and lobbying activities and base their choices for research locations not on costminimization, but on an attempt to maximize their political influence. Baker, supra note 120, at 8–15.
152 Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 5 (indicating that the costs taken into account by the
companies in calculating R&D costs are not clear, and that large and indirectly related costs (e.g., cost of
land and buildings used not only in relation to the R&D activities, cost of company-wide software or
hardware upgrades, legal expenses for developing patent protection, and legal defense against challenges,
etc.) are often indicated as R&D costs by pharmaceutical companies).
153 Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, at 1616 n.131.
154 DiMasi 2003, supra note 148, at 171–72.
155 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 140, at 19; Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A
Path to More Accessible Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 217, 234 (2010).
156 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 140, at 19; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 38; see, e.g.,
THE INST. FOR HEALTH & SOCIO-ECONOMIC POL’Y, THE R&D SMOKESCREEN: THE PRIORITIZATION OF
MARKETING
&
SALES
IN
THE
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
6
(2016),
https://nurses.3cdn.net/e74ab9a3e937fe5646_afm6bh0u9.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8UM-T2SK].
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“unknown and highly variable.”157 The critique indicates a significantly
lower amount of $43.4 million as a more realistic R&D cost per new drug.158
D. Pa en abili of AI S

em and AI-Gene a ed In en ion

Two issues lie at the intersection between AI and patents. The first issue
is the patentability of AI systems, and the second is the patentability of
inventions generated by these systems. For the purposes of patentability both
in the United States and other jurisdictions, AI systems are treated as
software inventions.159 However, given the potential economic, social and
ethical impacts of these systems, some commentators argue that their
patentability should be evaluated separately from other kinds of software
inventions.160 Essential medicines enabled by AI must be subject to different
standards of patentability due to similar considerations. The importance of
access to essential medicines in ensuring that the human right to health is
enjoyed by all and AI’s disruption of pharmaceutical innovation, requires a
higher bar of patentability for essential medicines enabled by AI.
The role of AI systems in the innovation process varies from one
invention to another. In some cases, AI systems assume the role of assistance
tools, aiding inventors in performing certain tasks, like a calculator or a
computer.161 In other cases, AI systems act autonomously, carrying out all
steps of the invention process without human intervention.
Questions of patentability arise where the role of AI systems increases
in the innovation process and human involvement and direction diminish. A
number of issues need to be resolved in order to answer the question of
whether inventions created by AI can and should be eligible for patent
157

Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 39–40.
Id. at 43–47.
159 In the United States, software can be patented provided that the claim passes the Alice-Mayo test,
which requires courts to identify the abstract idea in a claim and assess whether the claim adds
“significantly more” to it. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73
(2012); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215 (2014); NARD, supra note 109, at 221–32. In
Europe, the European Patent Office (EPO) responded to the rapid growth in the use of AI by issuing
guidelines concerning examination of AI inventions. According to the guidelines, AI and machine
learning “are per se of an abstract mathematical nature,” even if they can be trained, and AI inventions
are not patentable, absent the use of technical means. See EUR. PAT. OFF., GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
PATENT
OFFICE
pt.
G,
ch.
II-5,
§ 3.3.1
(2018),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/2A358516CE34385CC125833700498332/$File
/guidelines_for_examination_2018_hyperlinked_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF5G-PU9W].
160 KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE, WORLD ECON. F., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
COLLIDES
WITH
PATENT
LAW
8–9
(2018),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_Innovation_Protecting_Patent_Law.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/GHH2-65GL].
161 Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1093–94 (2016).
158
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protection. The issues, most of which are also raised in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) Request for Comments on
Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions,162 include the legal definition of
inventorship, interpretation of the patent eligibility standard of obviousness,
and the need for incentivization.
The issue of whether AI-enabled inventions require incentivization
relates directly to economic justifications of patent law. The purpose of the
patent system is to incentivize innovation, and it is uncertain whether
automated inventions also require incentivization.163 While it is clear that AI
systems themselves do not need any incentivization to innovate, some
commentators argue that the patent system should expand to inventions
created by AI, as patents provide the necessary incentives for developers of
these systems.164
162

The Request for Comments refers to
“[i]nventions that utilize AI, as well as inventions that are developed by AI” as AI
inventions, and seeks answers to the following questions: . . .
2. What are the different ways that a natural person can contribute to
conception of an AI invention and be eligible to be a named inventor? . . .
3. Do current patent laws and regulations regarding inventorship need to
be revised to take into account inventions where an entity or entities other
than a natural person contributed to the conception of an invention?
4. Should an entity or entities other than a natural person, or company to
which a natural person assigns an invention, be able to own a patent on
the AI invention? . . .
5. Are there any patent eligibility considerations unique to AI inventions?
6. Are there any disclosure-related considerations unique to AI
inventions? . . .
7. How can patent applications for AI inventions best comply with the
enablement requirement, particularly given the degree of unpredictability
of certain AI systems?
8. Does AI impact the level of a person of ordinary skill in the art? If so,
how? For example: Should assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the
art reflect the capability possessed by AI?
9. Are there any prior art considerations unique to AI inventions?
10. Are there any new forms of intellectual property protections that are
needed for AI inventions, such as data protection?
Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44889, 44889 (Aug.
27, 2019).
163
See Fraser, supra note 3, at 325–28 (discussing issues arising from incentivizing “automated
invention[s]” through the patent system); see also Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2240 (2018) (asserting that only people, not AI systems need incentives to
innovate).
164 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 161, at 1104 (asserting that allowing patent protection to inventions
generated by AI would “encourage innovation under an incentive theory”); Anne Lauber-Rönsberg &
Sven Hetmank, The Concept of Authorship and Inventorship Under Pressure: Does Artificial Intelligence
Shift Paradigms?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 570, 575–76 (2019) (asserting that while AI systems
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A second issue raised by the increasing use of AI in the innovation
process is whether the obviousness standard of patentability must be
reevaluated. The issue of obviousness is particularly important as it relates
not only to inventions created autonomously by AI systems but also to
inventions enabled by these systems.
In order to be eligible for patent protection, inventions must be nonobvious.165 The Patent Act references a notional “person having ordinary
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) in determining whether an invention is
obvious.166 An invention is not eligible for patent protection if the difference
between the invention and related prior art is obvious to PHOSITA.167
PHOSITA varies based on the invention, the field of related art, and the level
of education of those active in the related field.168 Certain fields, such as
pharmaceuticals, will likely require a higher skill level.169 In any case, the
more sophisticated the PHOSITA becomes, the more likely a new invention
will be deemed obvious.170 Once a legal fiction, developments in technology
have made an entity with full knowledge of prior art a reality.171 Some
commentators thus advocate for redefining the concept of PHOSITA and the
standard of obviousness.172
The final, and perhaps most important question raised by inventions
created by AI systems is whether these systems can be deemed as inventors
under the existing patent system. Neither the Patent Act nor the USPTO has

do not need incentivization, patentability of their inventions may be “necessary to stimulate investments
in the research and development of AI”).
165 See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
166 Id.
167 See id.
168 See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(indicating that the level of ordinary skill will be determined based on a non-exhaustive list of factors,
including “type of problems encountered in [the] art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with
which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in
the field”).
169 See Ryan Abbott, Everything is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 19 (2019).
170 Id. at 17.
171 Abbott, supra note 161, at 1124–25 (arguing that creative computers will not only have full
knowledge of the prior art in the relevant field but also in other fields, expanding the “universe of prior
art”).
172
See id. (arguing that as the role of creative machines in the innovation process increases, standards
for determining PHOSITA and obviousness should evolve accordingly); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice,
Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 574, 608 (2002) (arguing that tests of patentability, including “usefulness, novelty and nonobviousness, need to be” reevaluated to accommodate the changes in the concepts of inventorship and
the innovation process); Fraser, supra note 3, at 320 (arguing that PHOSITA and the bar for obviousness
may need to be reevaluated in light of increased use of AI).
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an explicit prohibition against patentability of AI-generated inventions.173
That said, the Patent Act defines inventor as the “individual . . . who invented
or discovered the subject matter of the invention,”174 and failure to correctly
indicate inventorship may result in invalidity of the patent.175 Accordingly,
the requirement that individuals be inventors would not only prevent AI
systems from holding patent rights but also the patentability of the resulting
inventions.
A recent significant development in this area involves patent
applications for two inventions created autonomously by an AI system,
which listed the system itself as the inventor.176 The system, called DABUS,
uses neural networks and general information in a given field to formulate
problems and create novel solutions without human intervention.177 It does
not need to be trained or tasked with solving particular problems; it is capable
of identifying problem areas and offering solutions completely
autonomously.178
The system’s creator and a team of experts applied for patents in the
United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for two inventions created by
DABUS.179 The applications marked the first time an AI system, not its
creator, was listed as the inventor.180 The USPTO, as well as the European
Patent Office (EPO) and the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office
(UKIPO), discussed the issue of inventorship in their responses to the
applications.

173 The U.S. Copyright Office, on the other hand, explicitly requires human authorship for a work to
be copyrightable. According to the Copyright Office, any work “produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention
from a human author” will not be protected under copyright. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM
OF
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
PRACTICES
§ 313.2
(3d
ed.
2017),
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTC9-U6WF].
174 35 U.S.C. § 100(f).
175 NARD, supra note 109, at 866.
176 See Patent Applications, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR, http://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/
[https://perma.cc/YS6A-YT6D].
177 Id.; see generally IEI s Patented Creativity Machine® Paradigm, IMAGINATION ENGINES,
http://imagination-engines.com/iei_cm.php [https://perma.cc/UHE8-SKS6].
178
See Patent Applications, supra note 176.
179
The two inventions are a beverage container that provides better grip, allowing easier
transportation, and an alarm signal that more effectively attracts attention. Id.
180 Other AI systems, such as the Invention Machine, have autonomously created patentable
inventions before, but the patents have been issued to the creator of the system. See, e.g., Jonathan Keats,
John Koza Has Built an Invention Machine, POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 19, 2006),
https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-built-invention-machine/
[https://perma.cc/KM63-GSGU]; U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002).

76

18:51 (2020)

Essential Medicines in the Era of Artificial Intelligence

The USPTO responded to the application with a Notice to File Missing
Parts of Nonprovisional Application, due to the applicant’s failure to
“identify each inventor by his or her legal name.”181 The USPTO’s final
decision on the applicant’s petition to vacate the notice discussed the issue
of inventorship and machine inventors in detail. The decision underlined that
the legal definition of invention under Section 100(a) of the Patent Act refers
to an “individual,” and that by using such wording as “whoever invents or
discovers” in Section 101 and pronouns “himself” and “herself” in Section
115, the Patent Act suggests that inventors must be natural persons.182 The
USPTO noted that “patent statutes preclude such a broad interpretation” to
construe the term inventor to cover machines.183 The decision went on to
explain that the idea of human inventorship is further supported by several
Federal Circuit decisions, Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as
well as the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.184
The EPO similarly rejected the applications on the grounds that they
failed to “meet the requirement of the [European Patent Convention] that an
inventor designated in the application has to be a human being, not a
machine.”185 In its decisions, the EPO pointed out that AI systems lack legal
personality and thus cannot have rights that arise from being an inventor.186
The EPO also declined the applicants’ assertion that they should acquire the
rights associated with the patent as DABUS’s employers, asserting that AI
systems “can be neither employed nor can they transfer any rights to a
successor in title.”187 Similarly focusing on inventorship issues, the UKIPO
concluded that the application did not include a proper statement of
181 In re Application No. 16/524,350 at 1 (Decision on Petition Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/16524350_22apr2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AUVTM2R] [hereinafter DABUS Application]. Stephen Thaler, developer of DABUS, has filed a complaint
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the USPTO, claiming that the rejection of DABUS’s patent
application “create a novel substantive requirement for patentability that is contrary to existing law and
at odds with the policy underlying the patent system.” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
2, Thaler v. Iancu, No. 1:20-cv-00903-LMB-TCB (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2020),
https://artificialinventor.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Complaint.pdf.
182 DABUS Application, supra note 181, at 4.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 4–6.
185 EPO Refuses DABUS Patent Applications Designating a Machine Inventor, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2019/20191220.html [https://perma.cc/8GG9HRDK].
186
Eur. Pat. Off., Grounds for Decision: App. No. 18 275 163.6, ¶ 27 (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E4B63SD62191498&number=EP18275163&lng=en&
npl=false [https://perma.cc/3S7X-V94D] [hereinafter App. No. 18 275 163.6]; Eur. Pat. Off., Grounds
for
Decision:
App.
No.
18
275
174.3,
¶
28
(Jan.
27,
2020),
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E4B63OBI2076498&number=EP18275174&lng=en&
npl=false [https://perma.cc/32NX-ZEDT].
187 APP. NO. 18 275 163.6, supra note 186, ¶ 30.
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inventorship, and accepted the applications withdrawn accordingly.188 In its
evaluations, the UKIPO ruled that as “DABUS is a machine and not a natural
person, . . . it cannot be regarded as an inventor.”189
E. The Need fo Refo m
The pharmaceutical industry asserts that robust patent protection is
required for innovation and that the current system helps reimburse the
unpredictable, costly and lengthy R&D processes associated with drug
development.190 The ultimate goal of the patent system is to provide
incentives for innovation for the benefit of the public.191 However, studies on
whether the patent system has a positive impact on innovation are
inconclusive.192
Moreover, social costs of the patent system, especially as they relate to
access, are particularly concerning in the case of pharmaceuticals.193
Pharmaceuticals are different from other products, as their consumption is
mostly based on need, as opposed to choice.194 Users of pharmaceutical
products are not consumers in the traditional sense of the word.195 They are
patients who depend on the products for purposes of treatment and health
care.196 Lack of access to certain drugs thus poses a risk to the health and

188 Stephen L. Thaler, BL O/741/19, ¶¶ 24–27, 30 (U.K. Intell. Prop. Off. Dec. 4, 2019) (decision),
https://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-challenge-decision-results/o74119.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4D-K4UW].
189 Id. ¶ 20.
190 See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Eisenberg, supra
note 102, at 346, 350; Kuhlik, supra note 102, at 94–99; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 1–2; Roin,
supra note 15, at 510–511; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Rowland, supra note 102.
191 MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 13, 17; Lemley, supra note 11, at 1031.
192 WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 9–10 (indicating that it is
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the patent system on innovation due to a lack of conclusive
empirical evidence); Baker, supra note 120, at 11 (indicating that it is not clear that the patent system is
“the most efficient way to direct research”); HAHN, supra note 107, at “Executive Summary” (reviewing
literature on “the role of patent strength in spurring innovation, diffusing information, transferring
technology, speeding commercial development of inventions, and stimulating economic growth,” and
concluding that there is no clear answer to the question of appropriate scope and duration of patent rights);
Sakakibara & Branstetter, supra note 103, at 78 (concluding that the Japanese patent reforms
strengthening patent protection did not result in increased R&D efforts and innovation output).
193 Sachs, supra note 117, at 161 (asserting that in the case of pharmaceuticals, deadweight loss may
put patients’ lives at stake); Gifford, supra note 101, at 123–24 (indicating that deadweight loss is large
in the pharmaceutical industry on a global scale); Flynn et al., supra note 117, at 186 (indicating that
deadweight loss has added significance for drugs essential to life and health); Outterson, supra note 117,
at 201–02 (discussing the social cost of pharmaceutical patents, and indicating that higher prices hinder
medical access).
194 Joseph, supra note 138, at 436.
195 See David Henry & Andrew Searles, Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy, in MANAGING ACCESS TO
MEDICINES AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 9.1, 9.6 (Martha Embrey & Marian Ryan eds., 2012).
196 Joseph, supra note 138, at 436.

78

18:51 (2020)

Essential Medicines in the Era of Artificial Intelligence

lives of individuals.197 As such, balancing access and incentivization is
particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry.
While pharmaceutical companies are for-profit entities, the nature of
their products begs the question of whether a different approach should be
adopted towards their products. Under the current system, pharmaceutical
companies use exclusivity rights to charge exorbitant prices.198 The human
right to health care cannot be achieved without proper access to essential
medicines. The next Part proposes models that maintain the benefits of the
patent system without compromising access to essential medicines.
III. RECALIBRATING ACCESS AND INCENTIVIZATION
The patent system, and the intellectual property regime in general, is
one of the many available models aimed at incentivizing innovation.199
Government incentives such as prizes and grants currently complement
patents in fields of research where additional incentivization is necessary.200
Many countries also rely on tax incentives to increase R&D activity.201 The
United States offers tax incentives for research and experimental
expenditures, as well as R&D tax credits, including a credit for
pharmaceutical companies engaged in orphan drugs 202 research.203 While
prizes and grants directly contribute to R&D funds, tax incentives decrease
R&D costs.204
197

See Sachs, supra note 117, at 161; Flynn et al., supra note 117, at 186; Outterson, supra note 117,

at 202.
198 MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 13; Gifford, supra note 101, at 83; Hemel & Larrimore
Ouellette, supra note 112, at 312.
199 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38, 228 (2004); Michael Kremer &
Heidi Williams, Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool Kit, 10 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 2
(2010); Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 304; Posner, supra note 104, at 58–59; Amy
Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 264 (2009).
200 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 316.
201 Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA . TAX REV. 25, 48
(2017); SILVIA APPELT ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY PAPERS NO. 32, R&D
TAX INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE ON DESIGN, INCIDENCE AND IMPACTS 6 (2016), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/5jlr8fldqk7j-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/76YT-F65G]. As of 2019, thirty out of the
thirty-six member countries for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
provide preferential tax treatment to R&D expenditures. See Measuring Tax Support for R&D and
Innovation:
Indicators,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-incentive-indicators.htm
[https://perma.cc/T3HG-K6U6].
202 Orphan diseases are those that affect fewer than 200,000 people in the United States. A disease
may also be categorized as an orphan disease if it affects more than 200,000, but there is no reasonable
expectation that the cost of developing and offering the drug in the market would be recovered from sales.
21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2).
203 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45C, 174.
204 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 311. There are at least two other incentives that
are particularly important for the pharmaceutical industry. Under advance market commitments (AMCs),
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In recent years, costs associated with the patent system have increased
interest in alternative incentive methods.205 “[S]trong public interest” in
access206 has led to a number of proposals specific to the pharmaceutical
industry. These proposals include a global R&D treaty207 and a national
medical innovation prize fund,208 both relying on a portion of the gross
domestic product (GDP) to fund R&D in the health care industry. 209 The
models proposed in the following section rely on funding through similar
mechanisms to accommodate innovating companies in the absence of patent
rights.
A. Main Con ide a ion
1. Different Approaches to Essential and Non-Essential Medicines
In evaluating access to pharmaceuticals, WHO differentiates between
essential and non-essential medicines. Essential medicines are those that
must be available at all times in adequate amounts at affordable prices.210
WHO has been publishing essential medicines lists based on current health
sponsors undertake to purchase a certain number of products at a predetermined price prior to
development. AMCs aim to encourage investment by increasing expected revenues and allowing
pharmaceutical companies to foresee and calculate potential returns. See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advance
Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16
HEALTH ECON. 491, 493 (2007); Ernst R. Berndt & John A. Hurvitz, Vaccine Advance-Purchase
Agreements for Low-Income Countries: Practical Issues, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 653 (2005); Michael Kremer,
Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 67, 83 (2002). In addition to systems
that directly or indirectly effect R&D costs, first-mover advantages resulting from being the first to market
a product also have a significant role in the pharmaceutical industry. Studies indicate that various reasons
such as reputation, slow information diffusion, and capturing the medical profession earlier, lead to a
significant advantage for first entrants in the pharmaceutical industry and that pharmaceutical companies
use their position as first entrants to build brand loyalty, as well as prevent competitors from using such
assets as manufacturing and distribution chains. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257 (2004); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The
Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PNAS 1252, 1254 (2005); Marvin B. Lieberman &
David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42–46 (1988).
205 Baker, supra note 120, at 25; Kremer & Williams, supra note 199, at 1.
206 WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 79.
207 Proposals focus on a global treaty where each country will contribute a certain percentage of their
gross domestic product to fund pharmaceutical R&D. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 120, at 14–15; Comm.
on the Env’t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, Report on EU Options for Improving Access to Medicines,
Doc. A8-0040/2017, at 36 (Feb. 14, 2017); DIMITRA PANTELI & SUZANNE EDWARDS, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. [WHO], POLICY BRIEF NO. 29, ENSURING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: HOW TO STIMULATE
INNOVATION TO MEET PATIENTS’ NEEDS? 14 (2018); Gifford, supra note 101, at 124; Tim Hubbard &
James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147, 0147–50
(2004).
208 The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017 proposes an R&D fund in place of any exclusion
rights in relation to drugs, biological products, and related manufacturing processes. See Medical
Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017, S. 495, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017).
209 See sources cited infra note 245.
210 WHO Essential Medicines, supra note 18.

80

18:51 (2020)

Essential Medicines in the Era of Artificial Intelligence

needs since 1977.211 WHO’s periodically updated lists provide a guideline
for countries to develop their own lists.212 The latest WHO list includes drugs
ranging from antibiotics to drugs used for the treatment of cancer, HIV, and
malaria.213
Access to essential medicines is “a key component of the fulfillment of
the human right to health.”214 The models here thus focus on essential
medicines. The models aim to increase access by reforming patentability
standards to leave some essential medicines enabled by AI outside the scope
of patentability, or alternatively, decreasing the patent term available for
such medicines. Non-essential medicines will remain under the existing
system, as they are less likely to have a significant impact on global health.
Patents on these medicines will allow innovating companies to freely decide
prices in the absence of competitors and help raise funds for future R&D
investments.
2. The Path to Patent Law Reform
Congress is limited by the United States Constitution in determining the
sphere of patent protection and granting exclusivity for limited terms.215 That
said, Congress is free to decide the scope and breadth of intellectual property
rights.216 It may impose conditions on patent rights, limit duration, refuse
granting privileges, or provide special rights for certain industries, as
opposed to employing a uniform intellectual property system.217 As such,
Congress has the authority to subject inventions concerning essential
medicines enabled by AI to different eligibility standards, as well as to confer
a different scope of rights to such inventions.
Nevertheless, any reform to the existing patent system must be
compliant with the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).218 TRIPS requires patentability of all novel, useful,
and non-obvious inventions, and prohibits differential treatment based on

211

Id.
Frederick Abbott et al., Global Health Law, 77 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 203, 210 (2016).
213 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (21st ed. 2019),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/325771/WHO-MVP-EMP-IAU-2019.06-eng.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/R3DM-HL2D].
214 Id.
215
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
216 ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS: BLACK-LETTER LAW AND COMMENTARY 30
(2007).
217 Id.
218 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
212
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technology.219 Article 27.2 provides an exception to this rule in cases where
protection of human life and health require exclusion of patentability. 220
However, the provision indicates that an invention cannot be excluded from
patentability based on this exception “merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by . . . law.”221
The models proposed here do not exclude pharmaceuticals from
patentability in general but merely change the standard of patentability, or
alternatively the exclusivity period, for essential medicines enabled by AI
with an aim to ensure wider access to pharmaceuticals. There is thus an
argument to be made that the proposed law reforms fall within the scope of
the exception. However, the best course of action is to urge the World Trade
Organization to recognize the right of countries to subject essential
medicines enabled by AI to different standards.222
3. Regulatory Exclusivity Conferred by the FDA
In addition to patents, FDA regulations provide two types of regulatory
exclusivities for certain groups of pharmaceuticals.223 The first type, market
exclusivity, prohibits the FDA from granting marketing approval to
substitute drugs within the exclusivity period; while the second type, data
exclusivity, prohibits competitors from relying on innovator company data
to receive marketing approval but allows approval of drugs that rely on the
competitor’s own data.224 To allow the proposed law reforms to have their
full effect and maximize access to essential medicines, Congress must also
abolish these marketing and data exclusivity practices.

219

Id. art. 27.1.
Id. art. 27.2.
221 Id.
222 A similar proposal has been made before by International Law Association’s Global Health Law
Committee. See Abbott et al., supra note 212, at 216 (proposing that the UN General Assembly adopt a
resolution to urge the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference to “provide an
authoritative interpretation of articles 27 and 30” that allows member states to exclude essential medicines
from patentability).
223
As of 2017, the FDA enforces sixteen exclusivities, “relating to new chemical entities, new
clinical studies, orphan drugs, pediatric studies, generic drugs, antibiotics, qualified infectious disease
products, enantiomers, and biologics.” See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R44951, REGULATORY
EXCLUSIVITY REFORM IN THE 115TH CONGRESS 1–3 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44951.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5N87-JELL].
224 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2020); 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2); Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 505(A), 111 Stat. 2296, 2305 (1997); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 7001, 124 Stat. 804 (2010); see also JOHN R. THOMAS, supra note 223, at 4.
220
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B. Re hinking Pa en La fo E en ial Medicine Enabled b AI
Pharmaceutical patents are relatively new in many countries. France,
Germany, Switzerland, and a number of other jurisdictions did not allow
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until after the mid-1900s.225
Before TRIPS, over forty countries did not protect pharmaceutical products
under a patent regime.226 While these countries issued patents for
manufacturing processes, third parties were allowed to produce the same
product through different, unpatented processes.227
This pre-TRIPS model may be ideal where the ultimate aim is to
maximize access. However, renouncing incentivization in favor of access is
an unrealistic approach given the industry’s overemphasis on its reliance on
the patent system.228 The models proposed in this Article thus aim to maintain
the benefits of the patent system and increase access to essential medicines.
1. Reforming Patent Eligibility Standards
Redefining standards of patentability and patentable subject matter, to
leave essential medicines enabled by AI outside the scope of the patent
system will increase access by ensuring a competitive market, which will
drive prices down. In this model, non-essential medicines will still be entitled
to patent protection, provided that the invention satisfies existing
requirements for patent eligibility. Innovating companies will similarly be
entitled to patent protection if they can demonstrate that their R&D processes
do not rely on AI systems.
The reform will be accompanied by a ten-year transition period where
an otherwise ineligible essential medicine will be entitled to patent protection
if (i) documentation from the FDA shows it to be more effective than
alternative products in the market, or (ii) if the innovating company
demonstrates the associated R&D costs to be considerably higher than
industry average.229

225

BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 140, at 215–18; DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 127–28.
WTO
and
the
TRIPS
Agreement,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
[WHO],
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/ [perma.cc/P8SB-S4HJ].
227 BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 140, at 215–18; DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 127–28.
228
See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Kuhlik, supra
note 102, at 94–99; Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 346, 350; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 1–2;
Roin, supra note 15, at 510–11; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Rowland, supra note 102.
229 A similar system of exceptions is proposed by F. M. Scherer, who proposes shortened patent
terms except in cases where first mover advantages are not sufficient or the related firm is small and has
a limited market, or an individual request is made based on a number of claims, including extraordinarily
high R&D costs compared to the relevant industry. See F. M. Scherer, First Mover Advantages and
Optimal Patent Protection 13–14 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t,
Working
Paper
No.
RPP-2015-05,
2015),
226
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The first exception will aid in directing R&D efforts to inventions with
potential for more social value. Under the second exception, innovating
companies investing heavily in their R&D processes, such as those
developing in-house AI systems, will be entitled to patent protection for both
essential and non-essential medicines. Through these exceptions, the new
system will retain some of the incentives available under the current regime
for a period of ten years. This transition period will allow for observation of
the new system and for adjustment of its application if necessary.
2. Shorter Exclusivity Term for Essential Medicines Enabled by AI
An alternative model is to maintain the existing rules and standards of
patentability and shorten the exclusivity term for essential medicines enabled
by AI to five years.230 The five-year term will commence on the earlier date
of marketing approval by the FDA or date of marketing. Upon expiration of
the five-year exclusivity term, third parties will be entitled to manufacture
and sell the patented product against a royalty to be paid throughout the
patent term.231 Similar to the first model, non-essential medicines, as well as
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/RPP_2015_05_Scherer.pdf
[perma.cc/GQ6M-MQ2H].
230 A study analyzing R&D profitability for different market conditions and patent terms concluded
that R&D investment is profitable under most market conditions regardless of patent term. See id. at 5–
8. The study indicated that the patent system aids innovation most significantly in smaller markets and
that short patent terms affect R&D investment decisions only in such markets and offered a five-year
patent term as an efficient alternative to the existing system. Id. at 6–7, 13.
231 As opposed to compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement, the parties will not be required
to negotiate licensing conditions in advance. Scholars have entertained the idea of similar systems, where
third parties would be entitled to use inventions or related data upon payment of a compensation to the
innovator during a predetermined period. See J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu:
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1744–98 (2000) (proposing a
“compensatory liability regime” for sub-patentable inventions, such as databases, where the amount of
compensation would be negotiated between the parties on a case-by-case basis, with the option to resort
to arbitration in case of failure to reach an agreement or where contribution would be determined based
on predetermined percentages of the third party’s gross revenue depending on how significant use of the
original invention is in the subsequent product); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of
New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 180–86 (2009) (discussing a compensatory
liability system, which can range from a mandatory compulsory license to less stringent applications,
allowing third parties to use the invention upon payment of appropriate remuneration); Lea M. Gulotta,
Pharming Out Data: A Proposal for Promoting Innovation and Public Health through a Hybrid Clinical
Data Protection Scheme, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1469, 1503–04 (2018) (proposing one-year
regulatory data exclusivity for all pharmaceuticals, followed by four years of cost-sharing with
subsequent users of related data); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to
Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 482–99 (2004) (proposing a system where generic manufacturers
can use data from brand-name manufacturers upon payment of a compensation in proportion to the benefit
they obtain from using such data, and providing a formula which can be altered based on market
conditions, in terms of length of time during which the brand-name manufacturer is entitled to royalties,
maximum number of competitors required to pay royalties, and interest rate to account for the time value
of money).
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inventions by companies which do not rely on AI in their R&D processes,
will enjoy the current twenty-year exclusivity period. This reform will also
similarly be accompanied by a ten-year transition period with exceptions for
more effective drugs and R&D costs exceeding the industry average.
The most important aspect of this model is to adopt a fair and efficient
royalty scheme. Royalties will be determined based on the total cost of R&D,
which the innovating company will submit to the USPTO during the patent
application process,232 and shared by the licensees wishing to manufacture
and sell the product. The contribution of each licensee may be determined
based on the markets where it plans to offer the product,233 or the total cost
may be shared equally by all licensees.234
Under the former scheme, the license will be liable for ten percent of
the total costs to sell the product in a market that represents ten percent of
the global market. In the latter, the total cost will be divided equally between
the licensees, and the amount of royalties owed will decrease with new
licensees. The maximum amount of compensation the innovating company
can receive may be limited to the total cost of R&D or to a predetermined
multiple of this amount.
C. E al a ing he Po en ial Effec of P o o ed La Refo m
There are multiple advantages to the models proposed in this Article. In
the first model, absence of exclusivity rights will enable competitors to enter
the market as soon as the innovating company makes the drug available to
the market. In the second model, a shortened exclusivity term will allow
competitors to enter the market in the relatively shorter period of time of five
years. In both cases, increased competition will bring down prices. In
practice, this will translate into more people having access to essential
medicines.235 By removing the restrictions on access to inventions by
competitors and innovators in other fields, the proposed models will also
have a positive impact on subsequent innovation.236
232 What items fall under R&D costs should be defined by the USPTO and the FDA, following
consultations with the industry.
233 For a similar method, see Gulotta, supra note 231, at 1503–04 (discussing a “pro rata data
exclusivity and cost sharing” model).
234 For a similar method, see Fellmeth, supra note 231, at 481–82 (discussing a “simple division
royalties model”).
235
For a discussion of high prices limiting access to pharmaceuticals, see Gifford, supra note 101,
at 83, 102 n.118; see also Dam, supra note 116, at 247; Barnett, supra note 101, at 1269; Burstein &
Murray, supra note 116, at 410; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023–24.
236 For a discussion of the patent system’s effects on subsequent innovation, see Outterson, supra
note 117, at 201–02; Stiglitz, supra note 120, at 1710; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023; NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 125; Gold et al., supra note 101, at 1; Boldrin & Levine,
supra note 122, at 1255.
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One drawback is that both models require a determination of what
constitutes enablement by AI. The USPTO will need to evaluate eligibility
claims on a case-by-case basis and decide whether the role of the AI system
amounts to more than a standard tool of research in each case. The models
may also raise some concerns regarding incentivization. Especially in the
absence of patent rights, innovating companies may shift their focus to nonessential medicines that will still be eligible for patent protection or opt out
from using or disclosing their use of AI systems. The models must thus be
accompanied by appropriate alternatives to preserve the benefits of the patent
system. The incentive methods set forth in the next Section are designed to
address these concerns. While these methods are aimed at incentivizing
R&D in the absence of patent rights and associated exclusivity periods, they
may be extended to the second model as necessary to supplement
incentivization through royalties.
D. Incen i i ing R&D fo E en ial Medicine in he Ab ence of Pa en
1. A National Prize Fund
A 2017 bill, the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, recently proposed
a national prize fund.237 The bill recognized market exclusivity to be an
“expensive, inefficient, and unfair mechanism to reward investments in new
products”238 and asserted that drug development would benefit from “greater
sharing of knowledge, data, materials, and technologies.”239 The bill
recommended removing the link between R&D incentives and product
prices, claiming that this will allow a dramatic decrease in the costs of
innovation and an increase in access to inventions. 240 The bill thus proposed
to abolish patents and market exclusivity for drugs and biological products,
as well as related manufacturing processes,241 and to fund R&D through a
national prize fund.242
This Article similarly proposes a fund with a specific focus on essential
medicines. Prizes will be awarded by a board, based on the impact of each
drug on global public health,243 and payments will be conditioned upon

237

Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017, S. 495, 115th Cong. (2017).
Id. § 2.
239 Id. § 2(5).
240
Id. § 2(3).
241 Id. § 5.
242 According to the bill, allocating 0.55 percent of the GDP in 2016 would have led to a fund of over
$100 billion. Id. § 2(4).
243 In a 2019 Senate hearing, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry indicated that they
favored “value-based” reimbursement, which would base compensation they receive from the market on
how effective their drugs are. Rowland, supra note 102. For different methods of measuring health
238
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abandonment of patents, if any. In addition to disclosure of all clinical trial
data and other information enabling those “skilled in the art . . . to make and
use” the invention,244 eligibility for prizes will require disclosure of all
relevant information on the AI system used in the R&D process.
A national prize fund designed in this manner will provide the
incentives necessary to sustain essential medicines research. The
government will also be in a position to allocate prizes to encourage
investment in certain areas over others. For instance, higher prizes may be
offered to essential medicines with smaller markets, such as orphan drugs.
Prizes for AI-enabled essential medicines will also encourage the use of AI
in the innovation process and allow access to data that will build a better
understanding of how AI systems work.
2. A Global R&D Treaty
The need to balance access and incentivization has led to calls for a
multilateral treaty to finance R&D and break the link between
pharmaceutical prices and R&D costs.245 Most notably, WHO proposed a
global R&D treaty where all countries would commit at least 0.01 percent of
their GDPs to government funded research focusing on the health needs of
developing countries.246 The United Nations supported the idea of a binding

impact, see AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES
ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 27–34 (2008).
244 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
245 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 120, at 14–15 (proposing a system where countries contribute in
proportion to their “comparable levels of development,” with the poorest countries contributing the least
or nothing); Comm. on the Env’t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, supra note 207, at 13, 36 (acknowledging
that access to medicine is a “shared responsibility of all actors” in the health care industry, and proposing
consideration of a R&D financing pool made up of 0.01% of each member state’s GDP); Abbott et al.,
supra note 212, at 216–21 (proposing a Framework Convention on Pharmaceutical Innovation with an
additional protocol on financing); PANTELI & EDWARDS, supra note 207, at 24 (arguing that a pooling
financial mechanism is a “necessary first step” for a sustainable global solution to delink R&D costs from
prices); Gifford, supra note 101, at 124 (arguing that the American public bears the cost of pharmaceutical
R&D more than other nations, as pharmaceutical prices are higher in the United States, and proposing a
system of public funding proportionate to each nation’s GDP or per capita income for a more equitable
solution). See generally Hubbard & Love, supra note 207, at 0147–50 (proposing a new trade framework
requiring countries to contribute a fixed percentage of their GDP and allowing them the freedom to choose
granting patents on pharmaceuticals once such contribution is made).
246 CONSULTATIVE EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON RES. & DEV.: FIN. & COORDINATION, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. [WHO], RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL FINANCING AND COORDINATION 84 (2012),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/254706/9789241503457eng.pdf;jsessionid=B990E9ACCB1DCE135E6F73EF0F5AD595?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2R8M8VGZ].
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R&D treaty focused on de-linking R&D costs from prices in the quest to
promote access to pharmaceuticals and incentivize innovation.247
As equal global access requires each country to share the cost of
research, a global R&D treaty should accompany the national prize fund.
Party states should contribute incrementally based on their respective GDPs,
with a certain percentage of the funds raised under the treaty dedicated to
essential medicines. To ensure widest possible access, essential medicines
that may be entitled to patent protection should be collected under a pool
operated by WHO, and made available to third parties against due
compensation.248 Any revenue raised by the use of these pharmaceuticals
would then be added to the R&D fund under the treaty.
3. Tax Incentives
In the United States, tax incentives related to R&D activities are
regulated under both state and federal law.249 At the federal level, Sections
41 and 174 of the Internal Revenue Code regulate tax incentives applicable
to R&D in all industries.250 Under Section 174, taxpayers are entitled to treat
research and experimental expenditures as expenses subject to certain
conditions.251 Credit for increasing research activities, regulated under
Section 41, provides a credit against tax for qualified research expenses.252
In addition, Section 45C provides a credit specifically for pharmaceutical
companies engaged in R&D for orphan drugs.253
While tax incentives do not result in direct funding of R&D, they
decrease the overall cost of R&D.254 Tax deductions and credits are thus a
247

HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, PROMOTING
INNOVATION
AND
ACCESS
TO
HEALTH
TECHNOLOGIES
31–32
(2016),
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report [https://perma.cc/YVT4-THDQ].
248 Medicines Patent Pool offers a similar model to increase access to HIV, Hepatitis C, and
Tuberculosis medicines in developing countries.
See MEDICINES PATENT POOL,
https://medicinespatentpool.org/ [https://perma.cc/X5NL-FBFW].
249 See Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate Effects
of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431, 431–36 (2009) (discussing state-based incentives and
their effect on R&D).
250 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 174.
251 Id. § 174(a). These expenditures include those incurred in connection with R&D and cover all
costs that are incidental to the development or improvement of a product, including the cost of obtaining
a patent, such as attorney fees. 26 C.F.R. § 1.174-2(a) (2014).
252
26 U.S.C. § 41(a). Expenses covered under Section 41 include in-house research expenses, as
well as a percentage of the amounts incurred as a result of third-party services. Id. § 41(b). The “contract
research expenses” are limited to sixty-five percent of any amount paid by the taxpayer to a third party,
or seventy-five percent of the amount paid to a qualified research consortium, for qualified research. Id.
§ 41(b)(3).
253 Id. § 45C. The credit is twenty-five percent of the qualified clinical testing expenses, which are
expenditures related to human clinical testing.
254 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 311.
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good method to provide additional incentivization for R&D. In 2018, Section
174 decreased the tax liability of corporations by $2 billion, Section 41
decreased it by $8.9 billion, and Section 45C by $1.1 billion.255
Expenses related to AI systems utilized in R&D likely fall within the
scope of one or more of the existing tax incentives.256 This Article offers an
additional tax incentive to complement the proposed law reforms in the form
of lower income tax for royalties and other profits generated from essential
medicines enabled by AI as discussed in the preceding sections.257
CONCLUSION
The patent system is widely criticized for its effect on restricting access
and hindering subsequent innovation.258 Effects of patents in the
pharmaceutical industry have particularly been the subject of extensive
debate.259 Health care is a human right, which cannot be achieved without
proper access to medicine.260
AI is revolutionizing pharmaceutical innovation.261 Faster and more
efficient R&D enabled by AI weakens justifications for pharmaceutical
patents. AI is a “game changer” in the health care industry,262 and the law
must keep up to ensure that society reaps the benefits. The principal goal of
the law reform proposals herein is to leverage AI’s disruption of
pharmaceutical innovation to ensure that the human right to health is enjoyed
by all.
255

See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
2018-2022
(2018),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?id=5148&func=startdown
[https://perma.cc/YFX2-448W] (estimating differences between tax liability under present legislation and
a scenario without the benefits provided therein, assuming that tax payers would behave in the same
manner under both circumstances).
256 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 174.
257 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R44522, A PATENT/INNOVATION BOX AS A TAX
INCENTIVE FOR DOMESTIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (2016) (discussing patent box tax incentives,
a basis for the proposed model, in such countries as the United Kingdom, France, and China, offering
lower income tax for various revenue generated from intellectual property).
258 See WOLFGANG HEIN & SUERIE MOON, INFORMAL NORMS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 143 (2013); Gifford, supra note
101, at 78; Joseph, supra note 138, at 428; Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927;
WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 78–81.
259 See, e.g., HEIN & MOON, supra note 258, at 143; WIPO Report on the International Patent System,
supra note 109, at 78–81; Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927; Joseph, supra
note 138, at 428; Gifford, supra note 101, at 78.
260 See supra notes 128–138 and accompanying text.
261 See supra Part I.
262 David Arney et al., A User-Focused Transdisciplinary Research Agenda for AI-Enabled Health
Tech Governance 5–6 (Jan. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkman Klein Center for
Internet and Society at Harvard University), https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2019-02/201901_aihealth.pdf? [https://perma.cc/3NB4-HAER].
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AI inventions raise questions about patentability and patent policy in
general. Recent developments signal that patent law reform is inevitable.263
Considering the lack of evidence on the efficiency of the patent system and
health care’s categorization as a human right, the pharmaceutical industry is
long overdue for a system that prioritizes access alongside incentivization.
AI’s disruption of the innovation landscape gives lawmakers the chance to
finally take action.

263
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